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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7

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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7 - 61
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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7
OUTGOING MESSAGE

1	4	7
2	5	8
3	6	9

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CLASSIFICATION

PAGE OF PAGES

2

SECRET NOFORN
 MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER

 IN FILES #

MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 182-75-4

1. EGYPT: EGYPTIAN VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK STRONGLY SUGGESTED TO AN INTERVIEWER IN SUDAN LAST WEEK THAT SYRIA CANNOT NECESSARILY COUNT ON EGYPTIAN SUPPORT IF IT INITIATES AN ATTACK ON ISRAEL. MUBARAK APPARENTLY WAS TRYING TO DISSUADE THE SYRIANS FROM INCREASING MILITARY TENSIONS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS BEFORE THE UN MANDATE EXPIRES ON SUNDAY.⁴

THIS IS THE MOST DIRECT SUGGESTION BY AN EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL THAT CAIRO MIGHT STAND ASIDE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. PRESIDENT SADAT AND OTHER EGYPTIANS HAVE ALWAYS SKIRTED THE ISSUE IN THE PAST, AFFIRMING THEIR BELIEF THAT SYRIA IN ANY CASE WOULD NOT START AN ATTACK.⁴

MUBARAK LAST WEEK TOLD A SUDAN NEWS AGENCY REPORTER IN KHARTOUM THAT NO STATE COULD START A WAR AND EXPECT AUTOMATIC SUPPORT FROM A FRIENDLY STATE, "BECAUSE THE SISTER OR FRIENDLY STATE MAY NOT BE READY TO ENTER THE WAR." HE AFFIRMED THAT EGYPT SUPPORTS SYRIA BUT SAID COORDINATION IS NECESSARY BEFORE INITIATING WARFARE.⁴

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER

NUMBER ABOUT 10 MILLION, HAVE STARTED TO MOVE INTO INDIA, THEY ARE CERTAINLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE UNSTABLE SECURITY SITUATION IN BANGLADESH, AND SOME MAY BE LEAVING THE COUNTRY.//4

//A FEW HINDUS REPORTEDLY WERE HARASSED IN DACCA SHORTLY AFTER A WAVE OF MUTINIES BEGAN IN THE ARMED FORCES OVER TWO WEEKS AGO. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SUCH REPORTS SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN SLOWLY REASSERTING ITS CONTROL OVER REBELLIOUS MILITARY UNITS DURING THE PAST WEEK.//4

//THE CENSORED INDIAN PRESS, MEANWHILE, HAS RECENTLY TAKEN ON A MORE EMOTIONAL AND PESSIMISTIC TONE IN ITS COVERAGE OF THE EVENTS IN BANGLADESH. THE PRESS HAS EMPHASIZED BOTH THE CONTINUING INSTABILITY IN BANGLADESH AND NEW DELHI'S CONCERN FOR ITS OFFICIAL PERSONNEL AND OTHER INDIAN NATIONALS THERE. IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS, TWO CALCUTTA NEWSPAPERS HAVE BLAMED THE DACCA GOVERNMENT FOR WHAT THEY HAVE LABELED AN "ANTI-INDIAN CAMPAIGN."//4

//NEW DELHI MAY BE REACTING TO RECENT IMPLIED CRITICISM OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT BY BANGLADESH'S DEPUTY MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATORS, GENERAL ZIA AND COMMODORE KHAN, IN CALLS FOR UNITY

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER
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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7

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2			5			0		
3			6			9		

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE TOT ACP TOG TPE MRO OCI

PAGE OF PAGES

0MF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

5 5

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF:

INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER

IP FILES #

AND DISCIPLINE, BOTH LEADERS HAVE CHARGED THAT EXTERNAL FORCES—A CLEAR REFERENCE TO INDIA—WERE BEHIND SOME OF THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS. ZIA AND KHAN COULD BE EMPHASIZING THE INDIAN THREAT IN AN EFFORT TO UNIFY THE POPULATION AND THE ARMED FORCES, BOTH RESERVOIRS OF ANTI-INDIAN SENTIMENT. {SECRET}// E-2 IMPDET.H

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CLASSIFICATION

COORDINATING OFFICER
Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7

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ISSUING OFFICER

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2		P			6	
3		6			9	

PAGE OF PAGES

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOG TPI MRO DCI

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2

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITY

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER
 IP FILES #

EAST ASIA BRTEF 182-75.4

1. CHINA: LIKE OTHER SECTORS OF CHINESE SOCIETY, THE PLA IS PREPARING TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE NEW CAMPAIGN TO BUILD TACHAI-TYPE COUNTIES AND MECHANIZE AGRICULTURE. THE ARMY HAS LONG BEEN INVOLVED IN RURAL AS WELL AS URBAN PRODUCTION TASKS, AND ITS PARTICIPATION IN THIS LATEST CAMPAIGN IS NOT SURPRISING. IN KEEPING WITH THE HIGH PRIORITY ATTACHED TO TACHAI, THE GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT {GPD} TOOK THE UNUSUAL STEP OF ISSUING A CIRCULAR THAT LAYS OUT THE BROAD GUIDELINES FOR THE ARMY'S PARTICIPATION. IN RESPONSE, A NUMBER OF MILITARY DISTRICTS HAVE ISSUED CIRCULARS OF THEIR OWN AND CONVENED MEETINGS IN ORDER TO LAUNCH THE MILITARY INTO THE CAMPAIGN.⁴

THE GPD CIRCULAR SUGGESTS THAT A LARGE PORTION, PERHAPS THE MAJORITY, OF TACHAI-RELATED ACTIVITIES WILL FALL ON ARMY MEN WHO HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO OR DEMOBILIZED IN THE RURAL AREAS. ACCORDING TO

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

ROUTING	1	4	7
	2	5	8
	3	6	9

AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI
0MF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX PER
 RETURN TO #
 IP FILES #

THE CIRCULAR, THESE CADRES AND FIGHTERS ARE TO WORK IN THE "FOREFRONT" OF BUILDING TACHAI-TYPE COUNTIES. SOME PROVINCIAL BROADCASTS HAVE ECHOED THIS THEME, AND THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT THE MILITIA IS ALSO BEING ASKED TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE. THE CHEKIANG MILITARY DISTRICT, FOR EXAMPLE, RECENTLY HELD A PROVINCE-WIDE CONFERENCE ON MILITIA WORK. THE MEETING, WHICH WAS ADDRESSED BY MD COMMANDER CHANG WEN-PI, WAS DESIGNED TO FIRE UP THE MILITIA FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE TACHAI MOVEMENT. MILITARY CADRES ARE ALSO GOING DOWN TO THE VILLAGES TO TAKE CHARGE OF ORGANIZING THE MILITIA'S ACTIVITIES, AND TACHAI MAY WELL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE MILITARY DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS TO RESPOND TO PEKING'S CALL FOR A TRIMMER COMMAND STRUCTURE WHILE FULFILLING THEIR OBLIGATION TO THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN.

REGULAR PLA UNITS ARE ALSO BEING PRESSED INTO SERVICE, BUT THE EXTENT OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IS

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

2		3		4		5		
3		6		7		8		

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
AGE COI ACP TOG TPS MRO DCI

0MF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES

4

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER
 IP FILES #

FAR FROM CLEAR. AT A MINIMUM, ARMY UNITS ARE EXPECTED TO DEVOTE A GOOD DEAL OF STUDY TIME TO THE "TACHAI SPIRIT" WHICH STRESSES SELF-RELIANCE AND A DISCIPLINED WORK STYLE. SOLDIERS ARE ALSO BEING ENCOURAGED TO PERSUADE COLLEAGUES WHO HAVE RECENTLY BEEN DEMOBILIZED, YOUNG RELATIVES, AND FAMILY MEMBERS TO SETTLE IN THE RURAL AREAS RATHER THAN THE CITY.⁴

REGULAR PLA UNITS ARE ALSO BEING USED DIRECTLY IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. EVIDENCE OF PLA PARTICIPATION IN TACHAI-STYLE PROJECTS ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF PEKING HAS BEEN OBSERVED RECENTLY. THE EXTENT TO WHICH REGULAR FIGHTING UNITS WILL BE CALLED UPON TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TACHAI MOVEMENT, HOWEVER, IS UNCLEAR. THE CIRCULAR SUGGESTS THAT THE EXTENT OF THE PLA'S PARTICIPATION WAS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS FOR THOSE IN PEKING WHO PLANNED THE TACHAI MOVEMENT. THE CIRCULAR REVEALS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONCERN THAT THE RENEWED EMPHASIS ON MILITARY TRAINING AND WAR

DATE:
 ORIG:
 UNIT:
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RELEASING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

COORDINATING OFFICERS

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

E 2

IMPDCT

CL BY:

ROUTING	1	4	7
	2	3	8
	3	6	9

AGE SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
 COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI
0MF 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES
5

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER
 IP FILES #

PREPAREDNESS MIGHT TEMPT COMMANDERS OPPOSED TO DIVERTING THEIR RESOURCES TO CIVILIAN ENDS TO IGNORE THE TACHAI CAMPAIGN. IN DISCUSSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CAMPAIGN, THE CIRCULAR SPECIFICALLY WARNS AGAINST IGNORING OR OBSTRUCTING THE CAMPAIGN. AT ANOTHER POINT IT UNDERSCORES THIS MESSAGE BY JUXTAPOSING MODERNIZATION OF THE PLA WITH THE TACHAI MOVEMENT: "...WHILE RESOLUTELY IMPLEMENTING THE SERIES OF DIRECTIVES OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION, LAUNCH ACTIVITIES TO LEARN FROM TACHAI IN A WIDESPREAD AND THOROUGH MANNER."⁴

WHILE PEKING UNDOUBTEDLY WANTS SOME ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT BY PLA REGULAR UNITS, THE CIRCULAR SUGGESTS THAT UNITS OUGHT NOT BE PRESSED INTO TACHAI ACTIVITIES WITHOUT A CAREFUL AND CASE-BY-CASE CONSIDERATION OF HOW THIS WILL AFFECT MILITARY READINESS. IN DISCUSSING THE BUILDING OF TACHAI-TYPE COUNTIES, THE CIRCULAR SPECIFIED THAT THE PLA WILL BE EXPECTED TO HELP

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7

2	3	4	5	6	7
3	4	5	6	7	8

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER
 IP FILES #

WITH MANPOWER AND MATERIAL RESOURCES ONLY "IF CONDITIONS PERMIT." APPARENTLY, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE NEEDS OF THE TACHAI PROJECT IN A GIVEN LOCALE AND THE MILITARY READINESS OR STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THOSE ARMY UNITS IN THE AREA. THUS FAR THE PROVINCIAL TREATMENT OF THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN MIXED. SOME PROVINCIAL BROADCASTS FAIL TO MAKE ANY MENTION OF ALLOCATING MILITARY RESOURCES FOR TACHAI PROJECTS WHILE A COUPLE OF OTHERS HAVE GONE FURTHER THAN THE SPD CIRCULAR IN INDICATING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RELEASE MEN AND MATERIAL ON BEHALF OF TACHAI. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.H

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

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CLASSIFICATION

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7

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SIGNIFYING OFFICER

E 2 IMPDET

CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING 1	4	7
2	5	8
3	6	9

PAGE OF PAGES

2

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER

EUROPEAN BRIEF 182-75.4

 IP FILES #

1. USSR - EASTERN EUROPE: CONSOLIDATION UNDER MOSCOW'S LEADERSHIP WAS THE HALLMARK OF SOVIET EFFORTS IN THE PERIOD AS THEY PROMOTED, PLANNED, OR HELD A SERIES OF MULTILATERAL MEETINGS. IN OCTOBER, SOME PROGRESS APPARENTLY WAS MADE IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE, BUT THE MEETING OF 28 PARTIES IN EAST BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 17-19 SHOWED THAT IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED. THE CONFERENCE NOW IS UNLIKELY TO BE HELD UNTIL AFTER THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY. WORK ON THE CEMA SUMMIT OF BLOC PARTY AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS ALSO MOVED IN FITS AND STARTS FOLLOWING MEETINGS OF SENIOR OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW IN MID-SEPTEMBER, AND IN EARLY AND MID-OCTOBER. A TENTATIVE DATE SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN SET FOR MID-NOVEMBER, BUT THE SUMMIT WAS POSTPONED AT THE LAST MINUTE, REPORTEDLY SO THAT IT COULD BE COUPLED WITH A WARSAW PACT SUMMIT. THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES THEMSELVES PARTICIPATED IN AN UNUSUAL FLURRY OF MEETINGS; A SERIES OF BILATERAL MEETINGS WAS FOLLOWED BY THE CONVENING OF THE PACT MILITARY COUNCIL IN LATE

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1							
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3

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

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OCTOBER AND THE PACT DEFENSE MINISTERS IN MID-NOVEMBER.⁴

THE ISSUES CAUSING THE BREAKDOWNS HAVE VARIED FROM ONE FORUM TO THE NEXT, BUT THE BASIC PROBLEM LIES IN MOSCOW'S SEARCH FOR RECOGNITION OF ITS LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AND THE SOCIALIST BLOC. TO ACHIEVE THIS RECOGNITION MOSCOW, THROUGH ITS EAST GERMAN ALLY, HAS SUBMITTED AT LEAST FOUR SEPARATE DRAFT DECLARATIONS TO THE COMMITTEES PREPARING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. EACH VERSION HAS BEEN BLANDER THAN THE ONE PRECEDING, BUT THE RESPONSE FROM INDEPENDENT-MINDED PARTIES IN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE HAS BEEN GENERALLY NEGATIVE. MOSCOW PERSISTES BECAUSE IT BELIEVES THAT EVEN WITH A TOOTHLESS CONCLUDING DOCUMENT--OR NONE AT ALL--THE HOLDING OF A CONFERENCE IS IN ITSELF SUFFICIENT TO GIVE SYMBOLIC RECOGNITION TO MOSCOW'S IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP.⁴

THE CEMA SUMMIT HAS BEEN RUMORED SINCE EARLY SUM-

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

1	4	7
2	5	8
3	6	9

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES

4

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX PER
 RETURN TO #

 IP FILES #

MER AND COULD WELL BE A MAJOR EVENT. THERE HAVE BEEN ONLY TWO SUCH SUMMITS, AND THE LAST GATHERING IN 1969 APPARENTLY TOOK DECISIONS LEADING TO THE WRITING OF CEMA'S LONG-TERM COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM. THIS YEAR'S SUMMIT WOULD REPORTEDLY CONCERN ITSELF WITH "RAW MATERIALS, MACHINE BUILDING, AGRICULTURE, AND TRANSPORT," WHICH COULD COVER SUCH SENSITIVE TOPIC AS THE SHARPLY HIGHER PRICES MOSCOW SUDDENLY IMPOSED ON ITS RAW MATERIALS EARLY THIS YEAR AND THE IMPACT OF THE SOVIET GRAIN SHORTFALL. THE SUMMIT IS ALSO EXPECTED TO DISCUSS GUIDELINES FOR FORMALIZING RELATIONS BETWEEN CEMA AND THE EC. EVEN WITH THE STATIC CREATED BY THE ROMANIANS, WHO OPPOSE THE IMPOSITION OF CEMA CONTROL OVER BILATERAL DEALINGS WITH THE COMMON MARKET, THESE QUESTIONS ARE NOT THE SORT THAT ARE USUALLY HANDLED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. A HINT OF A MAJOR CONCERN OF THE SUMMIT WAS GIVEN BY A SOVIET CEMA SPECIALIST, WHO SAID THAT "SOME ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

DISSEMINATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7
OUTGOING MESSAGE

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SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

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PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

5

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

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| <input type="checkbox"/> | INDEX | DISSEM BY: |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> | IP FILES | # |

IN CEMA ORGANIZATION MAY BE MADE, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CEMA SECRETARIAT." THIS MAY MEAN THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO CREATE NEW INSTITUTIONAL FORMS THAT WILL EXPEDITE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITHIN THE BLOC.

ANOTHER INDICATION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PUSHING FOR MORE INTEGRATION IS THE ACTIVITY OF THE WARSAW PACT. THE MILITARY COUNCIL REPORTEDLY CONTENDED WITH THE "CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES" CALLED FOR BY THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND ROMANIA'S CONTINUING REFUSAL TO ALLOW LARGE NUMBERS OF ITS TROOPS TO PARTICIPATE IN PACT EXERCISES. IT ALSO WRESTLED WITH THE PACT'S 1976 EXERCISE SCHEDULE. THE DEFENSE MINISTERS APPARENTLY CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS ON THIS TOPIC AND WENT ON TO DISCUSS "THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE JOINT ARMED FORCES" IN MOSCOW AND "THE CURRENT ACTIVITIES OF THE GUIDING BODIES OF THE JOINT ARMED FORCES." THESE FORMULATIONS ARE FAIRLY STANDARD BUT COULD IM-

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7

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CL BY:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

PAGE OF PAGES

AGE COI ACP TOG TPR MRO DCI
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6

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER

 IP FILES #

PLY THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO EXPAND THE NETWORK OF COORDINATING BODIES WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT. IF SO, A LARGE PART OF THE AGENDA OF THE RUMORED PACT SUMMIT COULD BE DEVOTED TO WAYS TO ENHANCE PACT INTEGRATION. THERE MAY BE A LINKAGE BETWEEN THE DRIVE FOR NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS PACT AND CEMA SUMMITS. ALTHOUGH PRECEDENTS ARE SOMETIMES FALSE FRIENDS, THE LAST EXPANSION OF THE WARSAW PACT WEB OF ORGANIZATIONS TOOK PLACE IN 1969, WHEN THE MILITARY COUNCIL AND DEFENSE MINISTERS' COMMITTEE WERE CREATED. THIS WAS THE SAME YEAR THAT CEMA DECIDED ON ITS "COMPLEX PROGRAM" OF INTEGRATION.⁴

EAST GERMANY IS WITHOUT QUESTION THIS SEASON'S MODEL STUDENT IN THE LESSONS OF INTEGRATION. TO THE ACCOMPANIMENT OF HIGH-DECIBEL PUBLICITY, VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE EAST GERMAN PARTY AND STATE LEADERSHIP TREKKED TO MOSCOW IN EARLY OCTOBER AND SIGNED A NEW, 25-YEAR FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH THE SOVIETS. THE NEW

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

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Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7
OUTGOING MESSAGE

1	4	7	
2	5	8	
3	6	9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
AGE COI ACP TOO TPE MRO DCI

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PAGE OF PAGES

7

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONT: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER
 IMP FILES #

TREATY INCORPORATED THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, ASSURING THE EAST GERMANS OF SOVIET FRATERNAL ASSISTANCE IF THEIR REGIME IS IN INTERNAL, AS WELL AS EXTERNAL, DANGER; EXTENDED THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL MILITARY AID BEYOND THE CONFINES OF EUROPE; AND OBLITERATED ALL REFERENCES TO GERMAN REUNIFICATION. THE TREATY WAS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF ACROSS-THE-BOARD COORDINATION AND COOPERATION, AND EXPANDED, THOUGH IMPRECISELY, THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS MOSCOW AND EAST BERLIN HAVE UNDERTAKEN IN THE WARSAW PACT AND CEMA TO INCLUDE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL COORDINATION.⁴

THE TREATY RATTLED THE YUGOSLAVS AND POLES. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THEY INTERPRETED THE TREATY AS A MODEL FOR THE OTHER EAST EUROPEAN STATES, AND THEIR RESPONSE SHOWED THAT THEY WERE HIGHLY DISPLEASED WITH THE POSSIBILITY. THE YUGOSLAVS, IN PARTICULAR, WERE DISTRESSED BY THE SHARP REMINDER THAT THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE WAS ALIVE AND WELL, WHATEVER THE IMPRESSION

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING	1	4	7	
	2	5	8	
	3	6	9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
AGE COI ACP TOO TPI MRO OCI

PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

8

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER

 IP FILES #

LEFT BY THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ACCORDS SIGNED IN HEL-SINKI. THE POLES WERE MORE RESTRAINED, TELLING WESTERN DIPLOMATS THAT THEY COULD SEE NO REASON FOR THE AGREEMENT AND CERTAINLY DID NOT FIND IT "CONSISTENT" WITH THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT. THE ROMANIANS, AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, ASSERTED THAT THEY WOULD NEVER SIGN SUCH A TREATY, AND ADDED THAT EVEN THE NORMALLY SUBSERVIENT BULGARIANS WOULD NOT FALL INTO LINE. YET THE RUMORS PERSISTED, AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF CZECH-OSLOVAK LEADER HUSAK'S TRIP TO MOSCOW IN LATE NOVEMBER SPARKED SPECULATION THAT HE WAS GOING TO FOLLOW HONECKER'S EXAMPLE. WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A NEW CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY WILL BE CONCLUDED, THE PRESENT TREATY, SIGNED IN 1970, ALREADY HAS THE KEY PASSAGES INCLUDED IN THE NEW EAST GERMAN ACCORD. EVEN WITHOUT A NEW TREATY, MOSCOW IS DOUBTLESS PREPARING ANOTHER FEAST CELEBRATING BLOC SOLIDARITY AS THE CENTERPIECE OF THE HUSAK VISIT.⁴

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

2	5	8	
3	6	9	

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF PAGES 9

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER
 IP FILES #

A STRIKING NEW DEVELOPMENT DURING THE PERIOD WAS THE SPATE OF RUMORS ALLEGING SOVIET UNHAPPINESS WITH THE QUALITY OF POLISH PARTY CHIEF GIEREK'S LEADERSHIP, THE DIRECTION OF POLISH ECONOMIC POLICY, AND THE FLOURISHING TIES BETWEEN POLAND AND THE WEST. ON THE SURFACE, SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS SEEM NORMAL, AND IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT SOVIET PARTY CHIEF BREZHNEV WILL ATTEND THE POLISH PARTY CONGRESS WHICH OPENS ON DECEMBER 8. BEHIND THE SCENES, HOWEVER, THERE ARE MUTTERINGS FROM POLAND ABOUT SOVIET PRE-TENSIONS IN CEMA; SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF POLAND'S MILITARY; SPECULATION IN WARSAW THAT MOSCOW MAY HAVE HAD A HAND IN THE SPATE OF FIRES IN OCTOBER IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT GIEREK; RUMORS OF A HASTY TRIP BY SOVIET PRESIDENT PODGORNY TO INTERFERE IN THE PRE-CONGRESS JOCKEYING BETWEEN GIEREK AND PREMIER JAROSZEWSKI; AND UNSUBSTANTIATED, LOW-LEVEL REPORTS OF SOVIET TROOP MOVEMENTS IN CZECHO-

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

1	4	7
2	5	8
3	6	9

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER

IP FILES #

SLOVAKIA AND THE USSR DIRECTED TOWARD PUTTING DOWN
 DISORDERS IN POLAND SHOULD A REPETITION OF THE 1970
 RIOTS OCCUR.4

THE SOVIETS MAY INDEED BE UNEASY ABOUT THE FLARE-UP OF UNREST CAUSED BY THE SHORTAGES OF CONSUMER GOODS AND RUMORS OF PRICE INCREASES, BUT RATHER THAN EXACERBATING THE SITUATION TO UNDERMINE GIEREK, MOSCOW HAS EXTENDED SEVERAL LOANS TO EASE POLAND THROUGH ITS DIFFICULTIES. AS THE PARTY CONGRESS APPROACHES, MOSCOW MAY BE HEDGING ITS BETS BY MAKING SYMPATHETIC NOISES TO JAROSZEWCZ, BUT PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THE SOVIETS THAT CONTROL OF POLAND CAN BE BETTER EXERCISED THROUGH A LEADER WITH SOME CLAIM TO NATIONAL POPULARITY THAN THROUGH A MAN MANY POLES CONSIDER TO BE SITTING IN MOSCOW'S POCKET NEVERTHELESS, THE CHARGE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE SOVIETS THAT POLAND IS ADOPTING A "NEO-ROMANIAN" COURSE MAY HAVE SOME SUBSTANCE. LIKE THE ROMANIANS, THE POLES HAVE

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING	1	4	7
	2	5	8
	3	6	9

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
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 OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

PAGE OF IMAGES

11

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER

 IP FILES #

ENERGY AND OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES OF THEIR OWN, AND SO THEY HAVE NOT BEEN HIT AS HARD BY MOSCOW'S HIKE IN PRICES. HAVING LESS NEED TO BEG FOR ECONOMIC FAVORS FROM MOSCOW, THE POLES ARE PURSUING A SOMEWHAT MORE NATIONALIST COURSE IN THEIR FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. THE CONFIDENCE GAINED FROM THIS EXERCISE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO WARSAW'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE EAST GERMAN EXAMPLE IN UPDATING ITS FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH MOSCOW.⁴

AS USUAL, THE BAD BOYS OF THE BALKANS--BUCHAREST AND BELGRADE--CAUSED SOME HEARTBURN IN MOSCOW. THE ROMANIANS AND YUGOSLAVS HAVE CARRIED ON AN OSTENTATIOUS FLIRTATION WITH THE CHINESE DURING THE PERIOD, BUT THE SOVIET REACTION WAS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, RESTRAINED. THE LIMIT WAS REACHED DURING THE VISIT OF YUGOSLAV PREMIER BIJEDIC TO PEKING. FOLLOWING A SPATE OF UNEXCEPTIONALLY INSULTING AFTER-DINNER REMARKS FROM THE CHINESE, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

ROUTING	1	4	7
	2	3	8
	3	6	9

AGE SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCI

PAGE OF PAGES

0MF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .

12

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

<input type="checkbox"/>	INDEX	DISSEM BY:
<input type="checkbox"/>	NO INDEX	
<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN TO	PER

<input type="checkbox"/>	IP FILES	#
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STALKED OUT, FOLLOWED BY THE BULGARIAN, CZECHOSLOVAK, EAST GERMAN, MONGOLIAN, HUNGARIAN, AND POLISH REPRESENTATIVES. THE ROMANIANS STAYED PUT, ALONGSIDE THE ALBANIANS, CUBANS, NORTH KOREANS, AND VIETNAMESE. BY WALKING OUT, THE SOVIETS REPORTEDLY WERE SEEKING TO SHOW THE BALKAN DUO THE LIMITS OF THEIR TOLERANCE FOR RAPPROCHEMENT WITH PEKING. 4

SOVIET DISPLEASURE OVER ROMANIAN SNIPING AT SOVIET POSITIONS--BOTH INDIRECTLY THROUGH THE STREAM OF VISITORS TO PEKING AND THE NUMEROUS ROMANIAN SPEECHES AND ARTICLES PHRASED IN AESOPIAN LANGUAGE AND DIRECTLY IN MULTILATERAL PARTY, CEMA, AND WARSAW PACT FORUMS--WAS UNDOUBTEDLY EXPRESSED DURING SO-VIET PARTY SECRETARY KATUSHEV'S VISIT TO BUCHAREST IN EARLY OCTOBER. CEAUSESCU AND TITO MAY HAVE DECIDED TO POSTPONE THE GET-TOGETHER THEY HAD PLANNED FOR MID-OCTOBER WHILE THE BEAR WAS AROUSED. THE ROMANIANS SENT PARTY SECRETARY ANDREI TO MOSCOW TO EX-

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010084-7
OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING	1	4	7
	2	5	8
	3	6	9

AGC CGC ACP TOG TPD MRO DCI PAGE OF PAGES

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

13

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- | | | |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | INDEX | DISSEM BY: |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | NO INDEX | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | RETURN TO | PER |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | IP FILES | # |

PLAIN BUCHAREST'S COURSE IN GREATER DETAIL, BUT HE MET A COLD RECEPTION. AFTER A SUITABLE INTERVAL, THE ROMANIANS RESUMED THEIR WAR OF WORDS, THOUGH AT A SOMEWHAT REDUCED LEVEL, AND MOSCOW HAS LAPSED INTO STONY SILENCE.⁴

BELGRADE'S RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW HAVE BEEN COMPLICATED BY ITS INTENSIFYING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE "COMINFORMISTS," AMONG WHOSE SINS IS A GREATER LOVE FOR MOSCOW THAN THE CURRENT YUGOSLAV PARTY LINE ALLOWS. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT CHOSEN TO GET CAUGHT IN THIS MORASS AND HAVE STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED PUBLIC COMMENT, THOUGH PRIVATELY THEY ADMIT RELATIONS ARE STRAINED. THE CHILL IN SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS IS REVEALED BY A COMPARISON OF PODGORNY'S REMARKS IN MID-OCTOBER TO THE OUTGOING YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR WITH THOSE MADE A MONTH LATER TO HIS SUCCESSOR.

PODGORNY HAD EARLIER SAID THAT MOSCOW "FIRMLY INTENDS" TO MAKE PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING RELATIONS IN

DATE:

ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT:

OUTGOING MESSAGE

ROUTING	1	4	7
	2	5	8
	3	6	9

SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY

PAGE OF PAGES

AGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO OCI

14 14

OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET NOFORN

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR

DATE-TIME GROUP

CITE

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

CONF: INFO: FILE

- INDEX DISSEM BY:
 NO INDEX
 RETURN TO PER
 IP FILES #

ALL FIELDS "IN ALL POSSIBLE WAYS" IN THE FUTURE.
 IN NOVEMBER, HOWEVER, HE WARNED THAT IMPROVEMENT
 MUST BE BASED ON "MUTUAL RESPECT AND CONFIDENCE,
 GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND SO-
 CIALIST INTERNATIONALISM." THE YUGOSLAVS WERE OB-
 VIously BEING PUT ON NOTICE TO KEEP THE ANTI-SOVIET
 ASPECTS OF THEIR ANTI—"COMINFORMIST" CAMPAIGN WITHIN
 REASONABLE LIMITS. (CONFIDENTIAL) 4 E-2, IMPDET-H

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 182-75-4

//GUATEMALA-BELIZE: [REDACTED]

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CITY ON NOVEMBER 27. THE DIRECTION THE DISPUTE OVER BELIZE TAKES NOW DEPENDS ON WHAT FACE-SAVING MEASURES THE BRITISH OFFER. IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR PRESIDENT LAUGERUD TO ACCEPT ANY PROPOSAL THAT DOES NOT HOLD OUT THE PROSPECT OF GUATEMALA'S GAINING SOME TERRITORY FROM BELIZE. {CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN} // E-2 IMPDET-H

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